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ARTICLE

INDIA & AUSTRALIA: A NEGLECTED LEGAL
RELATIONSHIP AND A PLAN OF ACTION
The Hon Justice Michael Kirby AC CMG*

ABSTRACT

Despite both being common law countries with some shared legal heritage,
the legal relationship between India and Australia has not been adequately
explored. Australia's legal system has strong links to that of England's Privy
Council and the Indian legal system also bears links to some English common
law doctrines. There is no dearth of concept and legal theory that judges and
lawyers in Australia and India can collaborate on. This article begins with the
author's own experience as a judicial officer in the Court ofAppeal in Australia
where he invoked judicial precedents from other common law countries,
including India, to rationalise his judicial reasoning. It analyses and compares
the development of legal traditions both in India and Australia, tracing it
through the development of the common law, innovations in legal reforms,
and the growth of jurisprudence through judicial decision-making. Finally,
the article lays down a comprehensive nine-step plan of action to cultivate a
stronger and lasting legal relationship between the two countries.
I.

INDIA REVISITED

On the :fiftieth anniversary of Indian independence, I salute the people and
the Constitution of India. I wish to reflect upon the links which Australian
lawyers share with India. We are two federal constitutional countries of the
common law. Until now our links have been comparatively few. I wish to
suggest that we should act to change this and to reinforce our neglected legal
relationship.
I come to India as often as I decently can. I have always held a fascination
for India. That feeling led me, as a young man, to spend two periods in my
life, each of four months, travelling around the sub-continent, from Cape
Cormorin in the south to the Himalayas in the north. From Calcutta to Goa.
In fact, I have probably seen more of the villages and towns of India than
most Indians. I present myself to you as an admirer of this country and its
Justice of the High Court of Australia. President of the International Commission of Jurists.
Visiting Honorary Professor at the National Law School of India University, Bangalore, India.
Honorary Doctor of Laws at the National Law School oflndia University.
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timeless culture. I am proud of the honorary degree which the National Law
School of India University has conferred on me. My visits to the University
are always stimulating and they have got me thinking about the things that
unite and those which divide our two countries.
IL

A CULTURE OF NEGLECT

The neglect by Indian and Australian lawyers of each other is as tragic as it is
puzzling. It is tragic because it represents a lost opportunity for two common
law countries, which are federations, which live by the rule oflaw, which are
governed under democratic, parliamentary constitutions and which, in their
different ways, protect fundamental human rights and basic freedoms.
I realise that some use has been made in India of Australian constitutional
decisions where the text of the Indian Constitution bears analogies to the
earlier Australian Constitution.1 I also realise that, occasionally, decisions
of the courts in each of our countries call upon reasoning of judges in the
other.2 Yet what is surprising is that there is relatively little such use. I say
that this is surprising because the language of the law in each country (or at
least of the superior courts and of the law reports) is the English language.
The similarities of our federal constitutions and common law techniques
are sufficient to present many potentially fruitful analogies. Our jurists
meet each other in international legal conferences. They generally respect
what they observe because of the substantial similarity of the professional
traditions which we share. The terminology and even the statutory lineage
of large areas of public and private law are so similar, at times identical, that
they invite useful comparison. For a time, we even shared, in the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council, a common apex to our respective judicial
and legal systems. To this day it is not uncommon (especially in matters of
criminal law) to hear the advice of that imperial juridical tribunal, in Indian
appeals, read to Australian courts.
Yet for all this, the use made oflndian judicial decisions and legal innovations
in Australia is comparatively small. The reverse is equally true. Why should
this be so, when we are virtually neighbours across the Indian Ocean? When
you are the most populous common law nation on earth, with many lessons

2
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to give? Why should it be so where each of us cherishes the integrity and
professional ability of the judges of our highest courts?
In part, the answer to my question lies in the way lawyers go about their daily
work. Problems present themselves. Lawyers must quickly find solutions. In
India, as in the United States, you have the treasury not only of the Supreme
Court but of many distinguished State courts working in areas of the law
of immediate national and general concern. Why should one bother to look
into the legal system of another country when there are so many riches at
home?
In Australia, the explanation is a little different. Until 1986, the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council remained part of the Australian Court
hierarchy. It was only in that year, by the Australia Acts, that the last line of
appeal to the Privy Council, from State Supreme Courts was terminated.3
Although appeals from Federal courts and the High Court of Australia came
to an end a decade earlier, 4 the residual and parallel right to appeal to a court
outside Australia, sitting in London, continued the link, long established
in the minds of most Australian lawyers, between the law of Australia and
the law as then expounded in England. Once, finally, that link was severed,
there has been a significant change both in the content of Australian law, as
found by the courts, and in the techniques by which the courts find the law.
In a sense, as you earlier discovered in India, the obligation to find the law
entirely within one's own country encourages a measure of creativity which
will not tend to occur so long as the legal system is answerable to judges
from abroad. Self-reliance also creates a greater sense of responsibility for
the content of the law, to ensure that it is appropriate to the society and
people whom the law must serve.
Because, as a lawyer, I grew up in an Australian legal system still answerable
to the Privy Council in London, it was commonplace for judges and
practising lawyers throughout Australia, including myself, to have on their
shelves not only the law books of Australian courts but also the case books
from England. So long as Australian courts were accountable to the Privy
Council, it was imperative that we should be aware of the developments of
legal principle in, and thinking of, those courts. To this day, in most judicial
and Bar chambers in Australia may be found copies of the Appeal Cases, the
3
4

Australia Act, 1986 (Aust), S. 11(1).
Privy Council (Limitation of Appeals) Act, 1968 (Aust); Privy Council (Appeals from the High
Court) Act, 1975 (Cth). See also Kirmani v Captain Cook Cruises Pry Ltd (No. 2); Ex parte AttorneyGeneral (Old), (1985) 159 CLR 461.
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Weekly Law Reports, the All England Law Reports and English textbooks and
digests. Although the line of appeal to the Privy Council has finished forever,
the English case books and case citations remain.

In part, this is because judges and lawyers are creatures of habit. Once the
case books are on the shelf, the difficult thing is to cancel the subscription.
It is easier to maintain the congenial habits of a lifetime. Furthermore, the
English reports remain a wonderful source of comparative law material.
In a very real way, the link of the Australian legal system, which serves a
comparatively small population of nearly 20 million people, to that of England
ensured that Australian law developed, in the early period of nationhood,
with the stimulus and direct contribution of one of the great legal systems
of the world. 5 Doubtless the Indian legal system is also indebted to that of
England. But for constitutional and other reasons, and because it long ago
severed its link with the Privy Council, India has been more eclectic in its
use of legal decisions from other places.
Now, Australia is taking the same course. But it was not always so.
Ill.WORKING AT THE LINKS

Soon after my appointment as President of the New South Wales Court of
Appeal (the busiest appellate court in Australia) I struck a blow for creative
links between the Australian and Indian legal systems. The case was Osmond
v Public Service Board of New South Wales. 6 The question was whether
the common law in Australia had advanced to the point that a recipient
of statutory power would be obliged, when asked, to state reasons for an
exercise of that power affecting the interests of the person requesting the
reasons. The common law in Australia had certainly advanced to the point
that judicial officers were required to give reasons. 7 However there was
English authority to the effect that administrators were not so required. 8
Courts repeatedly said that giving reasons was good administrative policy.9
But they would not support their pious statements with judicial orders.

5
6
7
8
9
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In the course of my opinion, in which I upheld the right to reasons, I invoked
developments in the United States of America, Canada, New Zealand, Fiji
and other common law jurisdictions. I then turned to India10 :
In India, the Supreme Court of India has elaborated, in a series of
recent cases, a general requirement for administrative tribunals to
give reasons for their decisions. Sometimes the requirements have
been founded on the 'elementary requirements' of a 'quasi judicial
process' (see e.g. Vedachala Mudaliar v State of Madras AIR 1952 Mad
276 at 280; Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v Walchand and Co
(Pvt) Ltd. AIR 1967 SC 1435); sometimes in the Indian Constitution
special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court (see e.g. Mahavir Prasad
v State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1970 SC 1302; Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd
v Shyam Sunder AIR 1961 SC 1669; Bhagat Raja v Union of India AIR
1967 SC 1606); sometimes in the review and supervisory jurisdiction
of the State High Courts (see e.g. Ragnath v Daulatarao AIR 1975 SC
2146); sometimes in the rule of law (see eg Mahavir Prasad v State of
Uttar Pradesh at 1304); and more recently in the principles of natural
justice.
The use of the principles of natural justice derived from the common law
of England, as a basis for the requirement to state reasons, has received its
most notable support in two recent decisions of the Supreme Court of India
in which the leading judgements were given by Justice Bhagwati, namely
Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co of India Ltd v Union of India, 11
and Maneka Gandhi v Union ofindia. 12
In Siemens, Justice Bhagwati said that the rule requiring reasons to be given
was 'like the principle of audi alteram partem, a place of principle and natural
justice'.13 The role of 'natural justice' in administrative law, an important
principle intended to 'invest law with fairness and to secure justice', was
stressed by Justice Bhagwati in Maneka Gandhi v Union of India. 14 Calling
on the language of Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest in Wiseman v Borneman, 15
Justice Bhagwati suggested that the 'soul of natural justice is 'fair play in
action' and that is why it has received the widest recognition throughout
the democratic world. In that case the Supreme Court of India held that
10
11
12
13
14
15

ibid 461.
AIR 1976 SC 1785.
AIR 1978 SC 597.

cf Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co ofIndia Ltd (n 11) 1789.
cf Maneka Gandhi (n 12) 625.
[1971] AC 297, 302.
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the Passport Authority was obliged to supply reasons for impounding the
passport of Mrs. Maneka Gandhi. The case is complicated by reference to
the Indian Constitution and various statutory provisions. However, the basis
for the obligation to provide reasons would appear to have been expressed
to lie in the duties of or akin to those imposed in this country by the rules of
natural justice.
In the Court of Appeal, Justice Priestly agreed with the result favoured by
me. Justice Glass dissented. The High Court of Australia granted special
leave to appeal from our decision. On the appeal there was barely disguised
impatience with my citation of so much foreign authority. Chief Justice Sir
Harry Gibbs expressed his opinion on the Indian cases thus 16 :
Kirby P (sic) referred to a line of Indian decisions in which it has
been held to be 'settled law' that where an authority makes an order
in exercise of a quasi-judicial function, it must record its reasons in
support of the order it makes! Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing
Co of India Ltd v Union of India.17 This, it was there said, is a basic
principle of natural justice. These decisions appear to state the
common law in India, although without a detailed knowledge of the
course of decisions in that country in would be hazardous to assume
that they have not been influenced by the provisions of the Constitution
of India or by Indian statutes .... When the rules of the common law
of Australia are unclear or uncertain assistance may be gained from
a consideration of the decisions of other jurisdictions, but when the
rules are clear and settled, they ought not to be disturbed because
the common law of other countries may have developed differently
in a different context. If the common law of India ... requires reasons
to be given for administrative decisions, it is different from that of
Australia.
The High Court of Australia reversed the majority decision of the Court of
Appeal. To this day, in Australia, the common law does not require officials
to give reasons for their decisions.
My purpose is not to dwell on the detail of the particular case or the sting
of reversal which, occasionally administered, may be good for the judicial
soul. High authority of Indian courts and other courts of the common law
world (indeed, if relevant, of civil law courts and international tribunals)
16
17
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would probably now be considered in the High Court of Australia in greater
detail in a case involving questions of general legal principle. Endeavouring
to unlock the legal mind from the capture of the English case books and to
release Australian lawyers from the long held connection with English legal
doctrine has been a major contribution of the High Court of Australia in
recent years. In Cook v Cook, 18 that Court, in the year of the final severance
of the formal link between the Australian judicial system and the Privy
Council, marked out the new regime. Commenting that the court under
appeal in that case had declined to follow judicial comments of two of the
foremost Justices of the High Court of Australia (Latham CJ and Dixon J)
whilst regarding itself as 'constrained to accept the reasoning of the majority
of the English Court of Appeal', the High Court of Australia said 19 :
Whatever may have been the justification for such statements in times
where the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was the ultimate
court of appeal or one of the ultimate courts of appeal to this country,
those statements should no longer be seen as binding upon Australian
courts. The history of this country and of the common law makes it
inevitable and desirable that the courts of this country will continue
to obtain assistance and guidance from the learning and reasoning
of United Kingdom courts, just as Australian courts benefit from the
learning and reasoning of other great common law courts. Subject,
perhaps, to the special position of decisions of the House of Lords
given in the period in which appeals lay from this country to the Privy
Council, the precedents of other legal systems are not binding and are
useful only to the degree of the persuasiveness of their reasoning.
As a consequence of this stance, the High Court of Australia has become
distinctly more eclectic. It is now not uncommon to have decisions cited
from many jurisdictions of the common law and far beyond. In De L v
Director-General, NSW Department of Community Services, 20 a recent case
involving the Convention on International Child Abduction, the Court made
copious reference to decisions in jurisdictions as far from our ordinary legal
traditions as Sweden, Germany, Israel, Argentina and Switzerland, as well
as the more traditional sources of England, Scotland, Ireland, Canada, New
Zealand and the United States of America.

18
19
20

(1986) 162 CLR 376.
ibid 39 per Mason, Wilson, Deance and Dawson 11.
(1996) 187 CLR 640.
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The advent of technology has presented many global and transitional legal
problems. These range from child abduction to international business
disputes and common problems in the field of human rights. Technology can
also rescue us from imprisonment in the English and Australian case-books
which still line the shelves of most lawyers' offices. Now, online legal services
provide ready means to capture the most up to date and specifically relevant
material from jurisdictions which once would, for practical purposes, have
been inaccessible. Under the constraints within which they usually operate,
lawyers cannot be expected to become masters of the law in a multitude of
foreign jurisdictions other than their own. However, the common problem
which courts today face and the global similarity of many legal issues require
of us all, especially in the higher judiciary, an open-minded attitude to the
assistance which we may receive from each other. That assistance may
be comparatively rare between countries such as Australia or India and
Argentina. The legal traditions are so different. But as between India and
Australia there are so many links of concept and legal theory that we owe it
to each other to become more familiar with relevant fields of jurisprudence
so that we may take advantage of the experience which each has to offer.
IV. LAW REFORM AND LEGAL CREATIVITY

Coinciding with the termination of appeals to a court outside the Australian
legal hierarchy has been a remarkable period oflaw reform and legal renewal
in Australia. It is worth mentioning this in the present context because, even
a superficial knowledge of the developments of the law in India demonstrates
that India is also going through a period of considerable creativity in the law,
some of it originating in the Supreme Court.
In 1981 the Supreme Court of India held that the right of an indigent person
to receive legal assistance was a fundamental human right which the courts
would uphold. 21 In Australia, although the courts have not gone so far, it has
been held (reversing earlier authority22) that a court of trial may stay the
trial of a person unable to afford legal representation where, if the trial were
forced to proceed with the accused unrepresented, the result would be an
unfair trial. 23 Clearly, each of these decisions has considerable significance
for the operation of the courts and for the budgets provided by the legislation
for legal assistance. The tradition of adversary trial, which Australia and
India have inherited from England, posits, for its effectiveness, at least in
21
22
23
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complex and serious cases, that parties will have access to accurate legal
advice and skilled legal representation. The full extent of 'the entitlement'
to legal representation in Australia is still being worked out. 24 Whether the
principle applies to an appeal against conviction after trial has not yet been
determined. How such a 'right' could be enforced where the remedy of stay
was not available is likewise left to conjecture. But it is plain that Indian and
Australian courts, at the highest level, are unwilling to condone, or participle
in, a charade of justice in which there is an appearance of a fair trial but the
reality is lacking.
The Supreme Court of India in S.P. Gupta v Union of India 25 took a strong
stand to ensure judicial redress to any person claiming legal injury or to
determinate class of persons who (by reason of poverty, helplessness, social or
economically disadvantaged position or disability) were unable to approach
the Court for relief. In such a case it was held that any member of the public,
acting bone fide and not for oblique considerations, could maintain an action
on their behalf. This amicus curiae could seek judicial redress for the legal
wrong or injury caused to such a person or determinate class of persons. 26
Although Australian law has not gone as far as this on the issue of standing,
it has undoubtedly advanced in recent years. 27 Proposals for further reform
have been made by the Australian Law Reform Commission.28
The development of the common law on standing is one area in which I
believe Australian courts, like those of many other lands of the common
law, have lessons to learn from India. The sheer complexity of social
and economic problems in India, and the common disability of the other
branches of government, have caused people to seek redress in the judicial
branch. In a series of creative decisions, the Supreme Court of India has
responded in a positive and effective way. Whilst judges must beware of
claiming expertise and performing functions outside those proper to the
judicial role, 29 that role is itself not frozen in time. Nor is it determined for
us, forever, by the traditions of the English law. Carefully and thoughtfully
the judicial role may be adapted to new needs, as the Supreme Court of
24
25
26
27
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cf New South Wales v Canellis (1994) 181 CLR 309.
1981 (Supp) sec 87.
SJ Sorabjee, 'Public Interest Litigation for Protection and Promotion of Human Rights: The
Indian Experience' (New Zealand Law Conference Proceedings, 1996, 40-48, 41.
Onus v Alcoa of Australia Ltd. (1981) 149 CLR 27,38,46,57; H Burmester, 'Locus Standi in
Constitutional Litigation' in H Lee and G Winterton, Australian Constitutional Perspectives, 1992
at 180 cited Lindon v The Commonwealth (No.2), (1996) 70 AUR 541 (HC), 547.
[1995] Reform*, 35. (*Reform is the Journal of the Australian Law Reform Commission).
cf Willson v Minister for Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Affair (1997) 70 ALJR 743; 138 ALR
220.
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India has undertaken. This is an area of the jurisprudence of India which, I
believe, could be studied with advantage in my own country.
One relevant law reform task which is of interest in Australia has been
assigned to the Australian Law Reform Commission. The Commission has
been asked to examine the adversarial system of litigation in Australia with
respect to administrative law, family law and civil litigation proceedings in
courts and tribunals exercising federal jurisdiction. The terms of reference
to the Commission exclude analysis of criminal proceedings where the
accusatorial trial is deeply entrenched. Constitutional questions may arise
in any attempts to change the basic system in Australia, about which I
must express no opinion. However, because India and Australia share the
adversarial tradition it may be of interest for you to know of this inquiry.
In reality, pure adversarial and inquisitorial systems are now hard to find.
Most jurisdictions have a mixture of the two techniques. Some features of
the inquisitorial system have become grafted onto court systems in Australia,
such that proactive judges are much more vigorously controlling, and
directing, the efficient resolution of cases. In Italy, which is predominantly an
inquisitorial system, aspects of the adversarial system have been introduced
into the procedures of criminal trials. One study discovered that passive
defence lawyers and bureaucratic prosecutors of the civil law tradition were
culturally ill-suited to the new adversarial contest. They were not disposed
to fight cases nor motivated to seek their efficient resolution. I suspect that
this is not a problem for Indian or Australian advocates. Nonetheless, in
Federal and State jurisdictions, and in a myriad of tribunals in Australia,
new procedures have been introduced, in the nature of 'case management'
to enhance court control over litigation. The parties no longer set the pace
and dictate the procedural steps of litigation. This languid approach of the
past has tended to clog the courts and reduce efficiency.
Another innovation in Australia has been the training of judges. This is an
example of the borrowing which is occurring from the traditions of the
civil law. In the French legal system, for example, judges graduate from the
National School for Judges into a career structure. 30 They are not chosen, as
judges in Australia and India typically are, from the ranks of independent
senior practising lawyers. In the complex world of the modern courtroom,
it is now regarded as imperative to give the new judicial officer training in
a wide range of subjects which may be required in judicial life and of which
30
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the new judge may have little experience. The training will encompass fields
of new legislation (such as for redress of discrimination), new ideas (such
as gender sensitivity), new legal topics (such as the impact of HIV/AIDS on
the law) 31 and old problems which we are only now facing up to (such as
stress and its impact on judicial life). I have myselflectured in the Australian
judicial course on the topic of judicial stress. 32 It made the audience squirm
a bit. But when they got used to speaking honestly and openly about the
problem of stress, its importance for judicial life was accepted.
Australia, like India has a most creative and professional law reform system.
Most law reform in Australia is achieved through the political process, i.e.
through the initiatives of government and the public service. It is in this way
that we have recently secured important statutory reforms: a new national
Corporations Law, 33 products liability, 34 the rights of Aboriginal Australians, 35
the redress of gender bias in the law, 36 to name but a few. Other important
reforms have been secured through the work of the institutional law reform
bodies, Federal and State. The Australian Law Reform Commission, which
at one time I chaired, is working on a wide range of topics extending from
the inquiry into the adversarial system (just mentioned), through the impact
of law upon children and young persons, a reconsideration of the handling
of complaints against federal Police, a review of the law on cross border
civil remedies, a consideration of the law on exchange traded derivatives,
a review of the Freedom of Information Act, 1982 (Aust), a consideration of
federal laws on disability services and, finally, completion on the review of
the of standing. State Law Reform Commissions in Australia are working
on topics ranging from the reform of sentencing law, the law affecting
intellectual disability, defamation law, uniform succession laws, consent to
medical treatment for young people, review of the law of evidence to such
basic problems as pawnbrokers legislation and review of the Justices Act.
Whilst most legal reform comes, as it should in a democracy, from elected
law-makers, the courts have also played a role in the modernisation of
Australian Law. Particularly since 1986, the High Court of Australia has
been prepared, where appropriate, to take bold steps in the development of
legal principle. Probably the best known of these was the Court's decision
31
32
33
34
35
36

MD Kirby, 'The Role of the Judiciary and HIV Law' in DC Jayasuriya (ed), HIV Law, Ethics and
Human Rights: Text and Materials (UNDP 1995).
MD Kirby, 'Judicial Stress' (1995) 13 Aust Bar Rev. 101.
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in Mabo v Queensland (No 2) .37 In that case, the High Court held that the
rights to land of Aboriginal Australians and Torres Strait Islanders survived
the acquisition of sovereignty over Australia by the Crown. Previously it
had been thought that such acquisition of sovereignty had destroyed socalled native title rights. The Court exploded this theory. As a result, the
Australian Parliament enacted the Native Title Act, 1993 (Aust) which
affords procedures whereby Australia's indigenous people may make claims
to native title which are determined by a Tribunal and the Court.
There have been many other bold strokes by the High Court, but none as bold
as this. In the field of criminal law the decision in McKinney v The Queen 38
may be noted. It laid down new rules for the admissibility of uncorroborated
and unconfirmed testimony by police and like officials. The rules were
designed to reduce the risks oppression and of conviction of accused persons
on false evidence.
The Criminal Law Journal in Australia has urged comparative law analysis
of Indian court decisions on criminal law. 39 The editors point out that the
Indian Penal Code was adopted in other countries of the region, such as
Burma, Sri Lanka, Malaysia and Singapore. Some of its notions have lessons
for criminal law in Australia, particularly in those States which have adopted
a Code 40:
We therefore encourage Australian law reform bodies and, indeed,
our judges, to refer to the Indian Penal Code as a possible model for
the reform of substantive criminal law..... Such a move would also
signal to our Asian neighbours that, in fundamental respects, our
views about justice, right and wrong, crime and punishment are much
the same. This in turn could foster shared ways of thinking about and
dealing with crime.41
One area of the law where the Supreme Court oflndia has recently examined
a broad band of jurisprudence in other common law countries concerns the
law of defamation and privacy. I refer to R Rajagopal v State of Tamil Nadu. 42
37
38
39
40

41
42
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This decision is interesting because it held that a local government authority,
like other institutions exercising governmental power, could not maintain
a suit for damages for defamation. A similar problem had been presented
to me in the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Ballina Shire Council v
Ringland.43 Like Justice Jeevan Reddy, I had access to English decisions
relevant to the point. 44 But he does not appear to have been referred to the
decision of the Appellate Division in South Africa in Die Spoorbond v South
African Railway45 to the same effect. I was not referred to the Indian decision
although it would have been most helpful.
The second important feature of the Rajagopal case arises from the use made
of implications derived from the Indian Constitution. The Court found that
the right to privacy was implicit in the right to life and liberty guaranteed
by Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.46 In Australia, the High Court has
recently derived implications of a constitutional freedom of communication
on matters relevant to political, economic and like concerns 47 although such
rights are not spelt out expressly in the text of the Constitution. Like the Indian
Supreme Court, the High Court of Australia has been concerned to perform
its function with a full awareness of the developments on constitutional
principle in other common law countries. This is the approach which Justice
Jeevan Reddy adopted in Rajagopal. I do not doubt that it will continue to
be the approach adopted in Australia. This does not mean blindly following
constitutional authority of other countries. The constitutional language will
be different. The societies in which the law must operate are different. But,
in matters of fundamentals, it is usually helpful to have one's own thinking
illuminated by the writing found in the opinions of the highest courts of
other nations, particularly those which share the same legal tradition. The
way in which those courts grapple with difficult problems will surely help to
illuminate the path for those that come later.
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V. A PLAN OF ACTION

What can we do to improve the awareness in India and Australia of each
other's laws? How do we break the spell of ignorance which has created
such a diversion between two neighbouring countries with such similar
legal systems? How do we build the links which will not only reinforce a
natural association between our two countries in this area but also facilitate
business and economic contacts, dependent on law?
I propose nine steps which could be taken without a great deal of cost:
1. Visits
There should be more visits and lecture tours by leading Indian and Australian
jurists to each other's country. The Australia India Council has begun this
process. It has arranged for me to return to India in January 1997 to give
lectures in New Delhi, Bombay and Bangalore. Through the good offices of
my friend, and colleague in the International Commission of Jurists, Mr Fali
Nariman, the Bar Association of India has invited me to deliver a lecture in
its annual series. The Australian legal profession should reciprocate. It is
hoped that the Chief Justice of India, or a Justice of the Supreme Court of
India, will later in 1997, give return lectures in Australia. Legal links have
been established between India and lawyers from the United Kingdom and
the United States. We should explore the creation of such links between
India and Australia.

2. Professional bodies
There should be more contact between the professional bodies in India and
Australia. Already, individual practitioners are linked through the association
known as Lawasia. The thirtieth anniversary of that body was recently
celebrated in Canberra, Australia. The keynote speaker, suitably enough,
was Justice Krishna Iyer of India. He, and a group of jurists (including from
India) visited Chief Justice Brennan and me in the High Court of Australia
in Canberra. Such contacts could be put on a more routine and permanent
basis. But this would require initiatives from the professional bodies of the
legal profession themselves. It would necessitate an interest to explore each
other's legal systems. A contribution could be made by governments, by
simplifying visa requirements. I have discovered that visas to enter India are
expensive. They are given for a limited duration only. The same is doubtless
true of visas to enter Australia. It may be hoped that this will change.

120

NATIONAL LAW SCHOOL JOURNAL

VOLUME 16, ISSUE 1

3. Publications
The libraries of the Supreme Court of India and the High Court of Australia
carry ample material from each other's jurisdiction. But it would be no
bad thing if the Australian government were to fund subscriptions of the
Australian Law Journal to be deposited in the High Courts around India
for circulation to the judges. Only when the judges become aware of the
jurisprudence of another country will questions be asked of the profession
that will send them searching for relevant analogies and precedents.
Subscriptions to legal periodicals are expensive. Complete collections
are extremely costly. Yet a few well planted contemporary copies of the
general Australian legal review, surveying the scene (as the Australian Law
Journal does) could bear fruit. It might produce reciprocation. Both India
and Australia still look to England for legal material. Yet, in all truth, the
constitutional arrangements of Australia are much closer to those of India
than are those of England.
4. Judicial training
Consideration might be given to funding the participation of a newly
appointed Indian judge or judges in the orientations and training courses
given for Australian judges. Judicial officers from New Zealand and PapuaNew Guinea take part in these courses. It could be mutually beneficial to have
participation by new Indian judges. It would help stimulate the thinking of
all. It would also create friendships which would endure and expand.
5. Professional reciprocity
As India's economic advancement continues, its importance in the global and
regional economies will become more obvious. Similarly, many Australian
businesses are now looking for opportunities in the region. Capital markets
are increasingly international in operation. With investment comes the
need for legal services. Consideration should be given to reciprocity oflegal
qualifications, at least for limited and specialised practice of law. The old
notion that lawyers are prisoners of their admitting jurisdiction must be
adjusted to the needs for specialist legal practitioners in connection with
trans-border transactions. Indian corporations operating in Australia will
require Indian legal experts and vice versa. Admitting authorities should
become more flexible in the provision of qualified practising rights, to reflect
the needs for legal services as their businesses venture beyond local borders.
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6. Universities
It would be a good thing if a Chair of lndian Law were established at one of
the Australian Universities. The most natural place for a specialisation in the
topic might be in Western Australia where there is a large Indian community.
The physical proximity oflndia is more keenly appreciated there. As business
links increase, the need for Australian jurists to be aware of lndian law,
particularly in the fields of commerce and public law, will become apparent.
Already some law schools (including at the University of Sydney and the
University of Technology, Sydney) are offering specialised courses in the law
of countries of East Asia. Curtin University, with the Indian Ocean Centre
might give thought to the establishment of a specialised Chair in Indian
Law. Funding for such a proposal should be considered by the Australian
Government. Indian Universities already include distinguished jurists who
have taught in Australian Law Schools, including Professor Upendra Baxi of
the University of New Delhi. As a young tutor at Sydney University, he once
taught me!
7. Scholarships
Consideration might also be given to increasing, on a reciprocal basis, the
number of scholarships by which young lawyers in India and Australia may
take courses in universities in each other's country. This would help them to
refine their knowledge of the legal system of the other. Comparative law is
always useful to lawyers of our tradition who, throughout life, must argue by
analogy. As the universities of Britain and the United States close their doors
to, or impose prohibitive costs upon, overseas students, those in the region
should explore the potential to meet the desire of young graduates to pursue
postgraduate education at a cost which they can afford.
8. Law schools
Judges and other senior practitioners should consider accepting
appointments as Visiting Professors in universities in India and Australia.
I have been appointed an Honorary Visiting Professor at the National Law
School in Bangalore. I have given lectures there in 1995. I will return early
in 1997. These occasions provide a useful opportunity for dialogue and for
learning about major legal trends. Even short-term appointments of this kind
are useful. The costs involved are minimal. Within Australia, the National
aid agency, AUSAID, should explore such possibilities with Australian
universities where undergraduates could be enriched and stimulated by
news of the creative lawyering which occurs in India.
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9. Young lawyers
The future belongs to the young. There are young lawyers' associations
in India and Australia. On my return from Gujarat and Rajasthan earlier
this year I took with me the journal of the Young Lawyers' Association of
India. I arranged for the Young Lawyers of New South Wales to establish
an exchange. For the most part, the lawyers of my generation lacked the
imagination to perceive the similarities and advantages which would lie
in creating links with jurists in India. They flew over India on their way to
England. In truth, their minds were locked into an attitude fixed in colonial
times. The law and its institutions have changed. Their minds had not.
Today, young lawyers in Australia and India are much more open-minded.
They are aware of regional imperatives and the economic opportunities
which they present. The more contact that can be established between
young lawyers in India and Australian, the better. A starting point lies in
the professional associations and in invitations offered to key players who
will take back the message of the many similarities that exist between our
respective approaches to the law.
Two countries sharing so many historical, linguistic, constitutional and
legal links, such as Australia and India, should have more connection than
they have. The Indian stereotype of Australia is probably as false as the
Australian stereotype of India. The time has come, on the brink of a new
millennium, to shatter the stereotypes and to forge a strong new relationship
of neighbourliness and mutual awareness. It does not require much for us to
achieve it. But will lawyers have the imagination to seize the chance of new
horizons?
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